Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Peter B. Lewis, Richard L. Kirkham and Paul Boghossian

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23 ideas

2. Reason / D. Definition / 4. Real Definition
9376 A sentence may simultaneously define a term, and also assert a fact [Boghossian]
3. Truth / A. Truth Problems / 5. Truth Bearers
18369 There are at least fourteen candidates for truth-bearers [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 1. Tarski's Truth / b. Satisfaction and truth
19318 A 'sequence' of objects is an order set of them [Kirkham]
19319 If one sequence satisfies a sentence, they all do [Kirkham]
3. Truth / F. Semantic Truth / 2. Semantic Truth
19320 If we define truth by listing the satisfactions, the supply of predicates must be finite [Kirkham]
3. Truth / H. Deflationary Truth / 3. Minimalist Truth
6345 Minimalism is incoherent, as it implies that truth both is and is not a property [Boghossian, by Horwich]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 5. First-Order Logic
19315 In quantified language the components of complex sentences may not be sentences [Kirkham]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 2. Formal Truth
9375 Conventionalism agrees with realists that logic has truth values, but not over the source [Boghossian]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 4. Satisfaction
19317 An open sentence is satisfied if the object possess that property [Kirkham]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
19322 Why can there not be disjunctive, conditional and negative facts? [Kirkham]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / d. Absolute idealism
21912 Fichte, Schelling and Hegel rejected transcendental idealism [Lewis,PB]
21911 Fichte, Hegel and Schelling developed versions of Absolute Idealism [Lewis,PB]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 4. A Priori as Necessities
9369 'Snow is white or it isn't' is just true, not made true by stipulation [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 8. A Priori as Analytic
9367 The a priori is explained as analytic to avoid a dubious faculty of intuition [Boghossian]
9373 That logic is a priori because it is analytic resulted from explaining the meaning of logical constants [Boghossian]
9380 We can't hold a sentence true without evidence if we can't agree which sentence is definitive of it [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 11. Denying the A Priori
9384 We may have strong a priori beliefs which we pragmatically drop from our best theory [Boghossian]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 2. Intuition
9374 If we learn geometry by intuition, how could this faculty have misled us for so long? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / c. Meaning by Role
9377 'Conceptual role semantics' says terms have meaning from sentences and/or inferences [Boghossian]
9378 If meaning depends on conceptual role, what properties are needed to do the job? [Boghossian]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 8. Synonymy
9372 Could expressions have meaning, without two expressions possibly meaning the same? [Boghossian]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 2. Analytic Truths
17721 There are no truths in virtue of meaning, but there is knowability in virtue of understanding [Boghossian, by Jenkins]
19. Language / E. Analyticity / 3. Analytic and Synthetic
9368 Epistemological analyticity: grasp of meaning is justification; metaphysical: truth depends on meaning [Boghossian]